1 renewed critical attention, it will be necessary to look more closely at the assumptions behind currently fashionable theories of social cohesion and of culture clash as well as theories of humanitarian intervention and multiculturalism. While this article cannot unpack each of these powerful concepts here, it argues that they function as interlocking ideas in the current global imaginary in ways that make it difficult to imagine viable alternatives to the current world order. Different understandings of individual and collective autonomy generate different prescriptions for managing intercultural and international relations.
This article speculates that if autonomy is what is at stake in different views of justice, then renewed attention to competing autonomy claims might aid in clarifying current arguments about cosmopolitanism and democracy. I hypothesize that contending ideas about autonomy lie behind current discourses of human rights, claims to nationstate and cultural autonomy, and democracy promotion. Understanding these discourses requires prior attention to assumptions about the nature and relations of autonomy, community, culture, and ethnicity on which they rely. Based on my review of current debates about these concepts, my argument then turns to Will Kymlicka's (2007) concept of liberal multiculturalism as a widely accepted but problematic way to address collective autonomy claims in globalizing contexts. I argue that his solution is not fully successful in taking account of shifting contexts of culture, autonomy, and community under contemporary globalization, in part because of its failure to address sufficiently the critiques launched by feminist, anti-racist, and postcolonial thinking on these issues. The autonomy of disciplinary practices and ways of seeing is also part of the frame that seems increasingly inadequate today.
2
The quotations that head this article address the changing contexts in which discussion of globalization and autonomy are now taking place. Once, as Seyla Benhabib (2006) implies, the autonomous will of democratic majorities within a nation-state might have ensured some semblance of legitimacy. With the rise of global cosmopolitan norms, on the one hand, however, and the rise of indigenous claims to forms of selfdetermination appropriate to a people but not necessarily a state, on the other, such a straightforward understanding of the justifying force of democratic self-determination no longer always suffices. Instead, as Nancy Fraser (2007) intimates, the frames, philosophical and institutional, through which national and international communities once recognized justice, are themselves now being thrown into question. A new "grammar" is emerging. This recognition is taking place across the disciplines. The challenge for globalization scholars is to chart this emerging "grammar of argument," in which alternative routes in the search for justice may be more appropriately rearticulated. Meeting these challenges is likely to require more collaborative, interdisciplinary, and international investigations, in which, I argue, such emergent frames as Bonnie Honig's (2006, p. 117) 
notion of "agonistic cosmopolitics" or what
Bert van den Brink (2005, p. 257) describes as the "non-agreement-based agonistic view" of political autonomy would need to be considered. These processual metaphors of contention, albeit framed by a rule-based structure, may implicitly challenge some of the assumptions built into the metaphor of a normative grammar.
My argument stems from work conducted with the Globalization and Autonomy project over the last eight years. This project set out to investigate the many ways in which globalizing processes were affecting autonomy, either putting efforts to exercise 3 autonomy under stress, given an increasingly interconnected world, as conventional wisdom seemed to suggest, or alternatively, enabling particular autonomy claims to gain more purchase as their circumstances changed. What we discovered about globalization's impact varied with the focus of our case studies and the specific definitions of autonomy each privileged. The more deeply we engaged with this topic, the more complex autonomy revealed itself to be.
In particular, notions of autonomy as self-government, the act of giving laws to oneself, exist in tension with notions of autonomy as indicating a bounded separateness or negative freedom from external influences. These definitions operate at both individual and communal levels, complicating the value assigned autonomy as a virtue and a public or private good. They enable autonomy to signify either a rejection of, or a commitment to, community, depending on which definition is privileged. Insofar as the dignity and very definition of the person who is the subject of human rights depends on her or his recognition as an autonomy-bearing individual, then human rights discourse may be seen as a logical extension of liberal theories of autonomy. But insofar as the autonomy of this individual, or of this person's investment in an indigenous or minority collective autonomy, might be seen as a threat to the state, then we seem to be presented with contending autonomies. The priority of state autonomy over other forms of collective autonomy itself depends in liberal democracies on the primary notion of individual autonomy. Human rights become an issue when a state is seen to over ride autonomy of the individual. The concept of cultural rights further complicates these relations. Are these too to be seen as deriving from individual human rights or from alternative notions 4 of collective communal autonomy that do not necessarily depend on separating the individual from the community in the same kind of way?
For those of us working on what became the book, Renegotiating Community (2008), these questions were further complicated by our awareness that concepts of community challenged assumptions about both nation-state and individual autonomy.
The larger team began with most participants working within social science frameworks assuming that autonomy, understood as self-determination or self-government, was a value worth endorsing and that the kind of autonomy that concerned our project was primarily the province of the nation-state in an international system of nation-states. This was the kind of autonomy that conventional wisdom suggested globalization was undermining. Humanists among us were more inclined to privilege individual autonomy as the model on which state autonomy then depended, or at least following Habermas saw the two forms of autonomy codetermining each other. Surprisingly, globalization studies has addressed much less attention to this interaction between forms of autonomy than it has to nation-state autonomy alone. Individual autonomy seems to be the province of philosophers, feminists, and political theorists whose work enters the globalization discussions only fitfully, if at all. In the same vein, philosophical considerations of autonomy tend to focus on its relation to liberalism (Christman and Anderson, 2005) , feminism (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000) , or bioethics (Owen et al., 2009) . Renegotiating Community (Brydon and Coleman, 2008) brought these different discourses together but more work needs to be done.
Our text wrestled, in part, with the challenges posed to liberal theories of autonomy by feminist and postcolonial critique. These cluster around two linked 5 perceptions of how autonomy functions from these perspectives. First, autonomy operates as a hierarchical concept privileging some at the expense of others by separating people assumed to be capable of exercising autonomy from those excluded from such potential, traditionally women, children, slaves, the disabled, and indigenous and other colonized peoples. Identifying these hierarchical dimensions of the autonomy-concept throws into question liberal autonomy's self-characterization as a democratic and potentially egalitarian concept. Second, and following upon the first observation, autonomy is a Western concept posing as a universal and employed to discipline and shape subjectivities into compliance with the progress of modern capitalism. Seen from this perspective, liberal autonomy's self-characterization as a liberating concept is problematized by recognition of its apparently in-built culture-specific and sometimes oppressive dimensions.
Eventually, the volume worked through some of these interactions through a series of case studies, which collectively came to question commonsense assumptions that globalization was uniformly threatening community autonomy. Although threats are certainly there, authors also recognize that many understandings of what community means and how it might operate are undergoing revision. Along with these revisions come challenges to communitarian and neoliberal assumptions about the autonomy of the individual within the community and about the nature of community autonomy itself. Our study focusses on sub-state or trans-state communities and their internal and external relations. We do not consider questions of national communities and nation-state autonomy nor of claims to secession made by national minorities. These issues are addressed to some degree, however, in a companion volume in the Globalization and out to answer these questions but they emerge, to varying degrees, from some of the circumstances we analyzed. I wish to investigate them more closely now.
In the context of such questions, then, this article focuses on nation-state autonomy in relation to globalizing pressures to respect human rights (rights to autonomy of the person and the right to self-government of ethno-cultural homeland and indigenous nations, a right that is also claimed in the name of autonomy). Most states currently have considerable autonomy (understood as independence) in controlling their response to international pressures in these areas. That kind of nation-state autonomy is often defended in the name of respect for internal nation-state sovereignty. Robert Jackson (1999, p. 432) defines sovereignty as "a legal institution that authenticates a political order based on independent states whose governments are the principal authorities both domestically and internationally." In such a definition, internal sovereignty indicates that domestically there is only one authority-the state. External sovereignty indicates the system in which states recognize each other as sovereign in these internal affairs (433).
However, globalization complicates these distinctions. Jackson notes that the modus operandi of sovereignty has been challenged before and has changed as a result (434) while defending the viability of the institution in current times. Catherine Dauvergne (2008) identifies nation-state sovereignty in respect to the defence of national borders as one of the key places where the contradictions of globalization may be most clearly observed. Noting that "refugee law is an exception to the general rule that sovereign states are free to decide who crosses their borders" (62), she deplores the many efforts of states to constrain this law so that "human rights norms have done little to assist illegal migrants" (21). Given this situation, in which "sovereignty is the uncontested barrier to meaningful, far-reaching reform in this area," she argues for the need "to think beyond it, and without it" (190) . Her insistence that 8 "decentralizing sovereignty is the only way forward" (190) issues a radical challenge to globalization theorists to rethink residual investments in sovereignty as a legitimizing concept.
Her argument suggests that with globalization, shifts in how sovereignty is viewed, by states and by civil actors, may be diverging, with implications for legitimacy.
States feel pressure to cede some of the autonomy implied by internal nation-state sovereignty in order to have a voice in influencing multilateral attempts to address problems arising from global economic, environmental and migration flows, among others, but they respond differently to these pressures. As Louis Pauly's article in this issue argues, the sacrifice of fiscal autonomy that may arise with the pooled sovereignties made necessary for responding to economic crises makes sense to states as a viable The reality is that multi-nation states are the global norm but the ideal nationstate, for many people, still seems to be a monocultural, single entity. This thinking often extends to attitudes to cultural and religious communities within the nation-state, as noted, and deplored, by Margaret Wetherell (2008) in an article about the gaps in assumptions separating academic research on these matters from political statements and policies in the United Kingdom. Theorists of autonomy need to rework this unbalanced relation between ideal conceptions and actual situations on the ground. Within the current tilt toward privileging the ideal, state sovereignty seems to over-rule multiple national autonomies. If the supreme power of authority rests with the nation-state, conceived as a singular unit, then it is free to ignore the collective autonomy of its minority subjects, as it sees fit. From the sovereignist perspective, the autonomy of the state is often theorized as something that cannot be shared; if it is fragmented, then social cohesion is thought to be at risk. Advocates of strong forms of social cohesion see local demands of national minorities and the global movements of people as a threat to nation-state autonomy and its ability to maintain security.
I think these advocates are mistaken. They are right to acknowledge the human need to belong to a collectivity larger than the individual but they are wrong to assume this need to belong can only be satisfied in one or two ways: either by living within an essentially monocultural nation-state or by adhering to a set of unchanging values within an essentialized "culture," which itself exists within a world in which different, identifiably distinct cultures seem doomed to clash. This view of autonomous and competing cultures remains remarkably resilient, engendering renewed critiques by Bhattarcharyya (2008) , Dirlik (2008) , Parekh (2008 ), Philips (2007 , and Razack (2008) .
At a political level, sovereignty and autonomy have often been confused yet it remains important to distinguish them if these questions are to be resolved.
In providing a basis for intervening to prevent crimes against humanity undertaken by or within a nation-state, the doctrine of "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P), arguably challenges the international relations understanding of both internal and external sovereignty in the name of a kind of humanitarian intervention that seems very similar to that used to support imperialist benevolence and paternalism in earlier times. To intervene in the name of protecting the autonomy (as the right to self-government) of minority groups within a state that oppresses them might theoretically accord more 13 respect to the ability as well as the right of other peoples to exercise autonomy (thus diminishing accusations of paternalism) but would not make the task of distinguishing between choice and coercion any easier in certain circumstances. Friedman (2003) , Philips (2007) and Razack (2008) full attention here. However, their argument that "the terms of the next order should be negotiated among all states, be they democratic or not, that provide responsible governance and broadly promote the autonomy and welfare of their citizens" (9-10), while a useful step forward, still evades the larger questions of definition and contending autonomies with which this article wrestles. A different argument sometimes made for R2P recognizes a responsibility to support the autonomy, the right to self-government, of those groups within the state whose capacities for self-steering have been abrogated. This argument too can be problematic. Both the initial adoption and the current wide-spread distrust of this doctrine provide further evidence of why renewed attention to autonomy is more urgent than ever.
In Renegotiating Community, our research team addressed questions that required us to think about globalization, autonomy and community in tandem. While we sought to recognize the problematization of each term under twentieth century conditions, we completed the project with a strong sense that ideas about autonomy required further 14 attention. Philosophers might contest Yash Ghai's (2000, p. 4( assertion that "There is no developed or reliable theory of autonomy; modern but contested justifications revolve around the notion of identity." But this contention seems appropriate for thinking about collective claims in the political sphere. As Ghai (2000, p. 2) indicates, "The use of autonomy as a species of group rights has changed the character of international law" and on the domestic level, it is changing ideas about "the organisation of state, the rationalisations of public power and the homogenising mission of the state." These changes are sufficiently powerful to lead Ghai to conclude that "Autonomy is increasingly becoming the metaphor of our times." Further support for Ghai's position might be found in Joseph R. Slaughter's argument, emerging from a different disciplinary formation. He claims that "The movement of the subject from pure subjection to selfregulation describes the plot trajectory of the dominant transition narrative of modernization, which both the Bildungsroman and human rights law take for granted and intensify in their progressive visions of human personality development (2007, p. 9) ." In other words, the story of how the autonomy-bearing subject is produced, within the plot of this type of novel and the narrative of human rights law, operates across these different spheres of constitution and regulation to make autonomy central to many of the debates of our times.
Renegotiating Community reaches a conclusion similar to that of Ghai: "There are limits to generalisations and comparisons, for the concession and operation of autonomy are contingent on several factors-such as history, traditions of governance, the size of territory, the size and number of communities, and internal and external pressures" (2000, p. 4). These variables must be taken into account when assessing the viability and desirability of autonomy claims in different circumstances. Equally important, however, are the different lenses that different disciplinary practices bring to bear on these questions. Too much of the considerable attention given to autonomy to date has occurred within disciplinary enclaves, particularly international relations whose very name is invested in a particular historical notion of autonomy, further complicating how the concept is employed and what is meant when autonomy is claimed or granted.
In synthesizing and clarifying these varied usages, scholars and practitioners need to listen to the range of disciplines that have been engaging these issues, within the full geopolitical contexts of different parts of the world. Valuing individual and national autonomy carries different implications for stability and justice in different contexts. Will a strengthened national autonomy aid or hamper poverty reduction, democratic practices, the attainment of social justice, the maintenance of a just peace? These are questions raised by Petra Rethman in her contribution to this special issue. Many indigenous theorists working within Canadian contexts are developing their own views on these issues. Literary critic Craig Womack's claim, that "Native literary aesthetics must be politicized and that autonomy, self-determination, and sovereignty serve as useful literary concepts" is cited approvingly by Kimberly Rappolo (2008, p. 311 In addressing what she terms the "culturalization of politics" (2007, pp. 19-24, 151, 167) , Wendy Brown notes it operates unevenly across the globe: "culture is understood to drive Them politically and to lead them to attack our culture, which We are not driven by but which we do cherish and defend" (20). In making this case, she cites Mahmoud Mamdani: "The moderns make culture and are its masters; the premoderns are said to be but conduits" (cited in Brown, 2007, p. 20) . This is the logic that the anthropologist Christoph Bruman (1999, p. 68) Kymlicka argues that multiculturalism is a liberal set of concepts and policies designed to address the rights claims of these three groups, claims that have been globally diffused as both a political discourse and a set of codified legal norms. He concentrates attention on those IOs that work at regional or global levels to promote models for governing diversity and on the deep divisions within these as to the merits of international norms of minority rights and the control of how they might develop. He contends that these IOs have considerable autonomy in defining their positions and they "have often exercised their autonomy in ways that box them into moral conundrums and political dead-ends" (2007, p. 13) . Therefore, he sees the "commitment to multiculturalism and minority rights as "now deeply institutionalized within the international community" (2007, p. 296) , but in such weakly theorized forms as to require serious rethinking if the project of internationalizing minority rights is to be put "on a more stable footing, conceptually and politically" (2007, p. 297) . In particular, he sees a need to distinguish more clearly between homeland national minorities and indigenous nations. This rethinking matters, in part, because of its implications for autonomy, democracy and citizenization.
Here is where the chief interest of Kymlicka's book may lie for globalization researchers. The problem as he sees it is that "Minorities around the world are demanding greater respect and recognition…Yet many post-communist and post-colonial states have difficulty responding to these claims…" (2007, p. 295) . As an advocate of the global diffusion of liberal multiculturalism, Kymlicka seeks to understand resistances to these 20 policies and to elaborate the conditions necessary for their acceptance. While acknowledging that these IOs seldom use the term multiculturalism themselves, Kymlicka employs it as an umbrella term to cover a range of policies that go beyond the protection of individual rights to "extend some level of public recognition and support for ethnocultural minorities to maintain and express their distinct identities and practices" (2007, p. 16) . Here is where I think the community/culture conflation could be usefully unpacked. Nonetheless, he also recognizes that "we need to get a range of contending approaches on the table, so that we can systematically evaluate their respective strengths and weaknesses" (2007, p. 298) . This would need to be an international and interdisciplinary conversation attending to at least the following three questions in his Recognizing the inadequacy of current scholarship in addressing his questions, Kymlicka calls for "a collaborative effort, drawing on the input of different academic disciplines, as well as different types of state and non-state actors, from different regions of the world" (2007, p. 298) . He sees a base for such a project in the work of three groups: "normative political theorists of the ideals and best practices of liberal multiculturalism, derived primarily from the experience of the consolidated Western democracies"; political scientists providing case-specific accounts of "conflict resolution techniques in weak or divided societies"; and international lawyers working on minority 21 rights. To fill the lack of systematic research on these questions, these academic groups need to come together to pool their knowledge (2007, p. 298-9) .
From my perspective, Kymlicka presents too narrowly based a project to successfully address these questions. Many other disciplines have worked on these questions and within different frames of reference. In a footnote, he acknowledges: "While liberal multiculturalism has been the most influential normative framework at the international level to date, we should not exclude the possibility that some other normative political theory can provide a better set of conceptual tools for addressing these dilemmas. It would indeed be very helpful if we had, say, a Buddhist or Islamic theory of international minority rights….To my knowledge, no such theories exist…." (fn 1, p. 299). This comment raises an interesting conundrum. To the extent that Western theories may well be the only locally-generated theories to posit universal systems based on their understandings of the world, such a generalization may possibly prove true although it seems unlikely. On the other hand, other cultures have generated their own debates within their own theorizations of appropriate relations to be established in relation to self, autonomy, and community. These are now complicating cross-cultural and comparative analyses of ethics and feeding into theorizations of global ethics, as Kymlicka knows. Yet the problem persists in his jointly edited book The Globalization of Ethics (Sullivan and Kymlicka, 2007) , which displays a tendency to see these other systems as monolithic, autonomous in the sense of self-contained, and unriven by internal debates. There are further problems with this footnote. Normative political theory may prove unable to provide the set of conceptual tools adequate to address globalization. In referring to Buddhist or Islamic theory, Kymlicka seems to imply that these categories 22 are not themselves disputed; that religious categories are to be counterposed to liberalism; and that the cultural foundations of these religions would have a conception of individual autonomy that leads to rights thinking, or that if they did not, then they could not usefully provide a foundation for new global arrangements. In other words, while appearing to acknowledge the possibility of a dialogue on equal terms, this statement can only see potential alternative systems within a Western frame and is only prepared to engage them on Western-centric terms.
In keeping with this approach, Kymlicka starts his inquiry in Multicultural Odysseys from the liberal multiculturalist perspective, rather than from an acceptance that the broader goals this approach might realize-increased (and possibly redefined) autonomy, democratization, peace, justice-could be accomplished by other means.
Kymlicka recognizes that "the status quo is not only imperfect, but in fact unstable" (2007, p. 316) but his suggestions for reconceptualising the issues remain narrow. The range of disciplinary expertise and cultural perspectives he suggests remains circumscribed and he takes insufficient account of the critiques of multiculturalism and the legal decisions in which these categories increasingly play a role that are raised by theorists sympathetic to autonomy demands such as Phillips and Razack. In the terms provided by Santos, Nunes, and Meneses (2007, p. xxiii), Kymlicka's form of multiculturalism expresses "the cultural logic of multinational or global capitalism," a logic they contrast with "emancipatory versions of multiculturalism" working out of recognitions of "'overlapping territories' and 'intertwined histories'," which call "for a complex procedure of reciprocal and horizontal translation rather than for a general theory" (1007, p. xxv). The extensive range of work undertaken on autonomy and rights discourses, and on globalization, community and culture, from perspectives derived from a range of perspectival, ideological, theoretical and geopolitical experiences, needs to be brought into dialogue with the kinds of studies privileged by Kymlicka, if a genuine dialogue is to be begun.
In this article, I have addressed the maneouvring space globalization affords communities and states to chart their own paths within global systems and the implications of how culturally-based autonomy demands (made on behalf of groups and individuals) are currently being received. I raise the question of how disciplinary autonomies shape understanding of culture and autonomy, because our questions and conclusions depend on the assumptions we begin with-and because the frames themselves are changing. For this reason, scholars need always attend to the kinds of demands that globalization makes on knowledge production, including the pressures it exerts on disciplinary autonomies and the demands it makes for inter-and crossdisciplinary investigation. This article has raised two dimensions of the globalization/autonomy relation: first, how it is changing understandings of cultural and political diversity, especially the rights claims of autonomy-seeking groups, foremost among these indigenous, ethnocultural communities, and women; and second, its implications for the conduct and dissemination of research. Kymlicka is highly critical of educational initiatives undertaken internationally to promote understanding of homeland minority nation autonomy as well as cognizant of the need for more systematic and largescale research. Likewise, Razack raises the question of how to identify and implement appropriate educational and pedagogical initiatives to challenge inequitable culturalist thinking but without providing any answers beyond deconstructing the faulty logic of 24 culturalist thinking. The challenge is clear but the way forward will require closer attention to the framing imaginaries within which communities, including academic communities, are constituted and the autonomy claims they are prepared to recognize.
